Archival Report on the Private correspondence of Gunnar Myrdal,
First Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe

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Autumn 2013 – December 13th, 2013
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Introduction

On December 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided that: “in order to give effective aid to the countries devastated by the war, the Economic and Social Council at its next session, give prompt and favorable consideration to the establishment of an Economic Commission for Europe”.1 Established effectively on March 28, 1947, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is charged with rebuilding a devastated post-war Europe, by raising the level of European economic capacity and strengthening the trading relations within all countries.2 On April 10, 1947 the General-Secretary of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, appointed Gunnar Myrdal Secretary General of the UNECE. Gunnar Myrdal was already a well-known scholar at that time. He was a Professor of Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics from 1933 and the Swedish Minister of Foreign Trade from 1945.

The formation of the UNECE coincides succinctly with the emergence of the Cold War, and especially the rising tensions in Europe, thereby adding intense levels of difficulty for both Myrdal’s mission and in this research and narrating this archival report. Myrdal recognized later that the first discussions between the members of the UNECE were extremely tense and the emergence of a strong rivalry between East and West made the situation extremely complex.4 Despite the fact that the relations between East and West were increasingly strained and complex, Myrdal focused on fulfilling his mission of reconstructing an integrated post-war European economy - one not simply limited to Western nations.5 This is where the narrative begins to divide. On one side, the secondary literature and initial archival findings place Myrdal and the UNECE at odds with the Western bloc backed by the United States (US) as he chose to pursue the required objectives. Additionally, opposition from the Eastern countries led by the Soviet Union (USSR) and a moderate support from the West prevented the UNECE from achieving the expected success owing to the original mandate, and threatened the very existence of the UNECE in its infancy.6 That said, when digging deeper into the material,

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1 See: Resolution of the Economic and Social Council Creating the Economic Commission for Europe, March 28, 1947
2 Ibid.
4 Myrdal, Twenty Years of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, pp. 2
5 Ibid. pp. 3
6 Wightman, East-West Cooperation and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, pp. 5
it is evident that there are contradictions at hand. Notably, the “micro-history” of the birth of the institution itself, it is clear that Myrdal’s colleagues were willing to compromise in order to garner political and financial support. This interplay of both the micro and macro perspective is enunciated in such examples of early disappointments and roadblocks, witnessed with the launching of the “Marshall Plan” on July 12, 1947 as the UNECE was not chosen by the United States to manage this specific task. This not only drove East-West tensions on a global scale, but also created question as to the value and functions of the UNECE as an organization. Interestingly by April 1953, the international situation had eased greatly. This end point is intriguing as it is neither precisely clear how and why this was the case, and furthermore, the story of the UNECE and the Cold War grand narrative make a clear break. The Eastern countries started to work on many projects with the UNECE in addition to new membership pledges from within the Eastern Bloc.

While the prescribed archives at UN League of Nations Library may provide an alternative story or additional clarity to this base narrative, the Myrdal papers ultimately tell a story of institutional survival and the struggle for international cooperation within the context of the Cold War - the twentieth century’s primary global division. The micro-history of Myrdal’s effort to provide relevancy to the UNECE sheds light on multiple layers of historical nuance at large, including, but not limited to, the international history of the Cold War; the formation and fundamental divisions within the UN and IO systems; and a contextualized history of international political economy in the post-war period. The aim of this report is to add clarity on the interplay of these historical narratives, while enunciating and elaborating upon their various levels. Furthermore it will display the material value and potential research opportunities that these archives can provide to future pursuits in this field.

Owing to the vast quantity of material available, the team opted to focus on the years of 1947 to 1953 for several reasons. First, this timeline was a compelling story as the future of the UNECE was far from certain, and Myrdal’s project could have collapsed at any time during these years. Second, there is a clear set of turning points between 1951 and 1953 provided in the archival sources with various explanations as to how and why these points came about. While some clear connections can be made between these

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7 Gunnar Myrdal’s brochure of the exhibition on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
historical stories that run in parallel, they both compliment and revise some commonly accepted themes on East-West relations at the time. Finally, with the solidification of the UNECE and validation of Myrdal’s struggle for, it is evident that there is a transition of political and economic importance within the frame of global history from Europe and North America to the “developing world.” One of the most helpful tools for interpreting these archives is an examination of the international political economy, trade in natural resources in exchange for technical expertise and capital tools of production moves from a story of East and West to a globally integrated history. The extracted implications are to follow in the body of this report and will be elaborated upon in the conclusion.

As with any research project, trials and tribulations were abundant, and this will be addressed with the hope of offering guidance to future explorers of the Myrdal papers. Questions and analysis will accompany several sets of key issues, but it is worth noting in the introduction some of the core problems at hand before presenting the team’s findings. First, there is an overwhelming abundance of primary information from which infinite avenues can be established. Settling on one core narrative with multiple incorporated themes was difficult even by substantially pairing down the number of years and types of materials examined. Second, while it was quite easy to match the Myrdal story to the grand narrative of the Cold War, it was significantly more difficult to elevate or even equate this comparative “micro-history” with the latter. Escaping from the shadow of the Cold War without denying its existence or the clear interplay between these two stories is a balance clearly fraught with issue throughout this report. Personal interpretation and subjective scholarly opinion could easily determine varying levels of value of these narratives, questioning the overall relevancy that each has to the other. Finally, and possibly most importantly, as with any available research, there is an inherent story waiting to be followed by design. Though extensive and largely up for full-interpretation, there is a clear set of points to follow in the Myrdal papers that our team had to find ways of avoiding. Again, these points will be constructed, built-upon and dissected in the concluding section of this report in order to elaborate the detail of the Myrdal papers and this project on the whole.
Core Narrative: 1947 – 1953

As noted, this section will examine the work of Gunnar Myrdal and the evolution of the UNECE from 1947 to 1953 with specific focus on his private correspondence within his close professional and personal circle. Supplementary archival sources include confidential, private and public memorandums given by Myrdal to the working groups and various committees of the UNECE along with pertinent news articles contemporary to the time. In the numerous exchanges between Myrdal, Glesinger Owens, and others, much of the correspondence is deemed private and top-secret. The discussions revolve around how they would manage to keep the UNECE as an institution and its mission alive from its foundation.

Within a few months after Myrdal took office as Secretary General of the UNECE, he asked Egon Glesinger, one of his closest friends and Chief of Forest Products Branch at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to send him a personal view of Myrdal’s biography.⁸ The two men shared deep thoughts about the objectives of UNECE and the future of the institution. In this biography, Glesinger stated that he was taken aback when Myrdal decided to enter the world of politics and the United Nations. According to Glesinger, Myrdal was everything but a diplomat and he wondered how his friend would be able to manage the very difficult task of leading a commission for the development of post-war Europe. This becomes important when deciphering Myrdal’s abilities as a leader and a technocrat. Glesinger accounts for this decision stating that it was the Soviet Union (USSR) and Eastern European countries that approved of Myrdal owing to the trust they could place in him.⁹

According to the Myrdal papers the central theme is on institutional survival and Myrdal’s personal struggle in implementing strategic reconstruction of Europe under his mandate of establishing formal trade agreements in an integrated European economy. This is made evident as with a few months after the creation of the UNECE, the United States decided to launch its own Economic Recovery Program for Europe outside of the United Nations. Glesinger explains in the biography that the launch of the Marshall Plan was a real shock for Myrdal, noting that Myrdal believed the UNECE was “licked before it

⁸Myrdal’s Biography by Glesinger, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 6 December 1948
⁹Ibid.
had even started”. Indeed the reaction from USSR and its constituent countries would consequently object. By November 1947, Myrdal announced that the delegations of the USSR, Byelorussia and Ukraine located in Berne would not be attending the first meetings at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

In a secret and personal memorandum dated on December 6th, 1947, Myrdal wrote that although the goals of the UNECE were similar to the objectives of the Marshall Plan, the latter was launched outside of the United Nations and could put an end to the very short story of UNECE as a functioning all-Europe platform for trade. In a confidential letter, David Owen, the Assistant Secretary General of Economic Affairs at Lake Success, NY, confided to Myrdal on December 30th that both the US and the British were pushing to create a full-fledged, Western-led organization in regards to the political leanings of the UNECE. Myrdal was not ready to throw in the towel as he tried many times to convince Moscow and especially the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to enter the Marshall Plan program. However, an unsuccessful Myrdal instead began to work with his chosen staff on “small matters” in order to ensure the longevity of the UNECE by garnering moderate support and mutual cooperation from the West and the East.

1948 proved to be a trying year for the UNECE as the private Myrdal-Glesinger correspondences began to subtly address the growing ideological divide. After a “tense six weeks”, there seemed to be no “international crisis at hand.” In a letter to Myrdal on April 9th, Owen was referring to the Communist Coup d’état in Czechoslovakia: “typical of Russian foreign policy” as it was “cold-bloodedly calculating short of precipitating a major crisis” by comparison with the much “ill-considered action by [their] American friends”. Deterioration of East-West relations quickly escalated during these months as Western state actors and members in International Organizations alike quickly

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10 Myrdal’s Biography by Glesinger, op. cit.
11 Industry and Materials Committee, First Session Summary Record, Gunnar Myrdal, Box 80, 22 November 1947
12 Myrdal’s personal and confidential memorandum, Note on the Political Background of the Crisis in ERP, Box 71, File No. 1/4/7, December 1949
13 Personal and confidential letter from Owen to Myrdal, Box 80, 30 December 1947
14 Myrdal’s personal and confidential memorandum, op. cit. and Myrdal’s personal memorandum, A note on the Development of American Attitude to EAST-WEST Trade in Europe after the Second World War, Beginning of December 1949
15 Ibid
16 Personal and confidential letter from Owen to Myrdal, Box 80, 9 April 1948, pp. 1
represented the USSR for this. Meanwhile in March 1948, Glesinger wrote of a confidential discussion with Dr. Rosenstein-Rodan, the Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This conversation noted the timber shortage in Western Europe, traditionally sourced from Eastern Europe, which was an essential component to the continental development and reconstruction. In turn, the IBRD and other began pushing for a strong Western Bloc owing to Soviet hostility towards western interests. Myrdal’s response dated on April 8, 1948 was that the “Whole Western World was getting hysterical” and stressed the importance of not falling into a psychological trap.

Sensing the potentially different political situations within the FAO, the United States and Geneva, Myrdal asked Glesinger to provide reports on the matter. Glesinger sent a letter in 1948 reporting that European recovery was an everyday topic of the presidential campaign between the Democratic and Republican parties in the US, emphasizing the importance of their work in Europe in the politics of both international domestic spheres. Interestingly, while it is clear that the “Americans [public and political leadership] had a natural concern about the Cold War” and were ready to “cut off the exchange of goods between the Western nations and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union”,

It is here that fundamentally the story of the UNECE diverges as it is full of contradiction, simultaneously adding nuance and sweeping away historical clarity. In the “micro-history” of the infancy of UNECE, it is unclear whether Myrdal is simply a technocrat focused on the tasks at hand; a skilled and networked diplomat within this institution and sponsoring countries; or if are their hidden stories regarding the agency of others. The longevity and survival of the UNECE in these formative years becomes embroiled in a side narrative of political intrigue as Myrdal’s network manages works to curry favor and secure resources from the Lake Success offices rather than being hampered by the political and economic institutions in the “European Office” in Geneva. What makes this component of the narrative interesting is that it provides

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17 Myrdal’s personal memorandum, *Note on the Political Background of the Crisis in ERP*, op. cit.
18 Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, March 30, 1948
19 Personal and confidential letter from Myrdal to Glesinger, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, April 8, 1948
20 Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, October 29, 1948
21 Personal and confidential letter from Owen to Myrdal, Box 80, 9 April 1948, pp. 2
22 Personal and confidential letters between Myrdal and Owen, Box 69, Dossier Varia, May-August 1948
23 Personal and confidential letters between Mr. Lethbridge (Chief of Financial and Administrative services of the European Office) and Mr. Price (Assistant Secretary General in charge of Financial and Secretary
voice and agency beyond Myrdal by removing the synonymous nature of his name and the UNECE. Instead “economics is politics”, and it is clear that his friends and colleagues in the US such as Owen and Glesinger are garnering support from Lake Success for projects of the UNECE. However, contradictory to this point, given Myrdal’s public speeches and his private correspondence between amongst his friends, especially in the subsequent year of 1949, it is clear that Myrdal is actively concerned with the idea that the UNECE transform into a Western-oriented institution. In essence, it is unclear whether Myrdal and his associates are simply paying lip service to their mission, or diplomatically pursuing a plan to garner support from Western institutions and nations. Furthermore, credit for these internal policies cannot be given to a specific individual amidst the UNECE staff. While this was an interesting research avenue, our team refrained from further examination of this sub-history into the institutional during this pivotal year, and instead continued to note the next major transition and mystery a few years later.

Beginning in the spring of 1949, Glesinger guessed that many former staff of the UNECE believed Myrdal to be depressed owing to the absence of his wife. However, while Myrdal might have been suffering personal hardships, Glesinger also believed this to be related to the difficulty in his work managing East-West cooperation within the framework of international trade and the growing political pressures from both sides.24 Facing financial pressure from short-term shortages in funding in 1949, Myrdal contacted the Swedish Ambassador to garner funding for committees maintenance to show support of Eastern countries. In desperation, he noted that without support many offices would be closed and the UNECE would be unable to court Eastern Members.25 This first divergence begs the question of who is Myrdal: a mid-level manager and technocrat with focused on functionary details or a networked diplomat working to achieve his end goal by any means necessary? It is entirely unclear from the archives if he has a one-track mind of creating a UNECE that promotes intra-European trade, or if this is mere lip-service and he is willing to allow the organization to become a Western-led institution in the short-term to keep the UNECE alive.

General located in Lake Success), Box 69, Dossier Varia, May-August 1948 and Personal and confidential letter from Myrdal to Moderow, 31 May 1948
24 Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, October 29, 1948
25 Confidential letters from Myrdal to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Consulate General, NYC, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 24 September and 12 October 1949
Several letters between Glesinger and Myrdal in early 1950 show that the US was not in support of East-West cooperation on trade, largely due to domestic political turbulence in the US with Senator Joseph McCarthy.\textsuperscript{26} It is unclear whether the tone of their own language shifts in according to his flare-up in events. However, Glesinger felt it necessary that the UNECE not push East-West trade relations as a core issue for fear of the repercussions.\textsuperscript{27} One drawback for the team when examining these archives was clearly defining the “lens” from which to look at political influence. With international and domestic policies weaving together, the entire narrative moves its focus from trade in resources into a coopted direction with multiple levels of politics within this story. Meanwhile, the USSR seemed to be equally unwilling to establish trade relations with the West via the UNECE as it sought to create its own regional trading program within its satellite countries.\textsuperscript{28} A few months later in the summer, Glesinger told Myrdal that the atmosphere of East-West tension in the US was entirely omnipresent after the conflict in Korea began\textsuperscript{29} with public figures such as a well-known journalist related to the founder of time Magazine, Henry Luce, announcing personally to Glesinger that their mission was essentially a failure from the beginning with no chance of revitalization after this.\textsuperscript{30} It is unclear whether this story of struggle has been manipulated in the compilation of these archives, or if this potential collapse of the UNECE was considered truth at the time. However, what adds nuance to this story along with contradictory complication is the idea that the UNECE appears to be on the verge of collapse by 1950, and yet makes a dramatic change the following year without a clear explanation. Similarly, one could make arguments for either of the “Myrdal narratives” mentioned above with this material when interpreting the shift in fortune for the UNECE.

Subsequently, communications between Glesinger and Myrdal from the beginning of 1951 until the end of 1952 essentially come to an end until they resume in 1953, but these too provide minimal insight. It is unclear if the documents were perhaps lost or purposefully destroyed. However, logistically the FAO moved from Washington to Rome at the end of year 1950\textsuperscript{31}, which could mean that Myrdal and Glesginer were

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\textsuperscript{26} Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 3 March 1950
\textsuperscript{27} Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 27 April 1950
\textsuperscript{28} Article: Russia Found trying to Direct Satellite Trade, Box 89.
\textsuperscript{29} Personal and confidential letters from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 4 and 18 August 1950
\textsuperscript{30} Personal letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 4 December 1950
\textsuperscript{31} Personal and confidential letters from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 6 December 1949 and 4 December, 1950
\end{flushleft}
able to meet each other more easily than before in a climate of easing tension both domestically in the US internationally. However, the letters from the beginning of 1953 seem to be a kind of watershed in the private correspondence because the situation for the UNECE seemed to have changed considerably. This was a massive mystery for the team, especially since this gap of correspondence would likely be critical in explaining the rapid change of fortune for the UNECE.

There are several potential explanations as to why the USSR suddenly turned around, which the archives hint at without fully explaining. One account reads that the Soviet satellite, trading bloc had failed by 1951 owing to the lack of funds from the Marshall Plan, thus forcing the USSR into a massive and unsustainable subsidization program of resources and finished goods. Another possibility is based on the UNECE’s tactic of leveraging the lack of “technical expertise” in the USSR, and which they hoped cold be exchanged for commodities and natural resources. A final and more subtle explanation hidden in the archives is the UNECE’s move to trade with the “developing world” to replace the resource gap traditionally filled by the East. While there seems to be no specific policy, the trend of examining Brazilian, Bolivian, African, and Asia’s Far East as sources of food, timber and energy begin to creep its way into the various archival sources. This trend continued into 1952, while simultaneously the USSR hoped to expand trade relations with the “capitalistic countries” for “technical expertise”.

In the spring of 1953, Glesinger wrote to Myrdal that Eastern cooperation was increasing rapidly, especially in the UNECE’s Technical Committee. The East appeared in desperate need of technical assistance, and thus willing to negotiate. Likewise the UNECE’s Timber Committee received new funding from Soviet Union for technical assistance, and the Soviets were sending delegations to the UNECE conferences. Myrdal had would welcome the returning Czech and Polish delegates, as well as Rumanian and

32 Article: Soviet Satellites Show Trade Drop, Box 89, 1951
33 Myrdal Speech at Sixth Conference of FAO, Box 79, 19 November 1951. pp. 6, Myrdal’s Opening Speech Seventh Session of UNECE, Box 79, 3 March 1952, pp. 6; and Myrdal’s Opening Speech, Timber Committee Eleventh Session, Box 61, 5-10 October 1953, pp. 3.
34 Article: Trade a Mutual Benefit, News, No. 2, Evgeny Menyhinsky, Box 89, 2 July 1951.
35 Myrdal’s Opening Speech to UNECE Seventh Session, Box 79, 3 March 1952 and Sixth Conference of FAO, Speech by Myrdal, Box 79, 19 November 1951, pp. 3-6.
36 Personal and confidential letter from Own to Myrdal, Box 80, 11 April 1952
Albanian representatives for the first time.\textsuperscript{37} Glesinger stated that Soviet change in policy gave a green light to the other Eastern countries to foster new relations with the UNECE committees. Glesinger also seemed stunned by the turn around of the West as the US embraced the UNECE Timber Committee with enthusiastic support. He was particularly excited by the evolution of the situation as they were finally meeting their objective of fostering strong East-West trade cooperation.\textsuperscript{38} This narrative and the archives that support this window of time will be examined in the following section, but safe to say that despite the clean and polished nature that this story provides, the explanations and details are shrouded in mystery and contradictions highlighting both the benefits and the shortcomings of the Myrdal Papers.

\section*{Conclusion}

As addressed in the prior sections of the paper, this section will examine the team’s research and subsequent findings, implications, interpretations, benefits and shortcomings of the Myrdal Papers within the context of this proposed six-year narrative. Again, the timeline of 1947 to 1953 was chosen as there is a clear starting point with the “birth” of the UNECE and compelling story that ends with its mysterious success after several years of seemingly imminent trouble. The archives perhaps even reveals more questions rather than answers when cross-examined with the various potential research narratives. Most evident in these archives are the intertwining personal story of Myrdal and institutional history of the UNECE. However, as the research lens can be crafted and adjusted according to scale such as macro or international, micro or institutional, or sub-micro or personal, the overwhelming amount of material may leave the reader with substantial research avenues from which to follow.

One of the biggest roadblocks in the Myrdal papers is the sheer volume of primary information. We went into the archives with a blank slate knowing relatively little of the institution, the man, and the time. We immediately started to use what we

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{37} Timber Committee, Eleventh Session, Rome, Myrdal’s Opening Statements, Box 61, 5-10 October 1953, pp. 1
\bibitem{38} Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, Box 68, File No. 1/3/7, 23 October 1953
\end{thebibliography}
knew to create patterns. This was beneficial as we could narrow our research quickly, but limited our thinking to one path or another rather than keeping windows open to notice other trends in the sub-history. While the team could afford to pick and choose according to a fashioned narrative, we were in some ways forced to avoid data and information that would lead to a different set of research questions and yet might have answered the same questions. Future researchers could easily make connections alone from all the budgetary information pertaining to salaries, committee budgets, translations costs, expenditures on utilities, etc. However, given the organization of the files and the lack of transparent comparative evidence (i.e. budgets for UNOG vs. Lake Success overall, funding from the US for UNECE vs. other IOs, etc.), it did not seem like realistic use of time given the constraints of this report.

Our team instead chose to examine the political and diplomatic functions of Myrdal, his associates, and the UNECE. Much of the evidence seems to tell the story of Myrdal’s daily timetable, which is hard to decipher. Given his future status and the work of the UNECE, there is temptation to think of his work as extremely important. But how much time did he spend managing budgets, answering letters, dealing with day-to-day functions as opposed to managing the economic reconstruction of Europe or diplomatically crafting methods of garnering support for the UNECE? In essence this personal story in the archives pushes the researcher towards a serious story to find and define important events that have direct correlations with the macro vision, while marginalizing the rest of the material. In short despite Myrdal’s place in history, information selection on our part has the possibility of over inflating the importance of specific events in an attempt to elevate this historical narrative, which in turn adds to the layers of dust on other components of this story. One of the most perplexing questions that our team could not clearly answer was: what were the catalysts that set off the transition from “failure” to “success” in 1951 to 1953. While the team passed over seemingly trivial information such as postcards, requests for new building equipment, and personal correspondence speaking of travel and dinner plans, we were ultimately forced to create limitation based on time and research capacities with each research avenue feeling like a journey “down the rabbit hole.”

This is challenging balancing act most evident as we attempted to escape from the shadow of the Cold War narrative. While scanning for key words, we immediately
found it compelling that the **specific language of Cold War history that we take for granted today was hardly mentioned in any of the sources.** Even the term “Cold War” is rarely mentioned. **Still, the very fact that the team looked for this trend shows the teleological mindset and the monolithic narrative, which was a constant reminder of our own mindsets in finding clarity within these archives.** Deconstructing our collective mindsets from what we know and what we have learned to find ways of elevating or at least equating the Myrdal and UNECE story with this grand narrative was a constant struggle.

The archives themselves possess both grand and implicit issues, leading to a general narrative to follow or purposefully avoid. Though voluminous, there is inherent exclusivity. The view and mindset follows top officials and leaders with limited scope from both East and West. This is most evident in linguistic terms, but also in choice as the USSR and Eastern countries chose to remain on the periphery during the earlier years. While this incorporating Eastern participation is an ongoing problem for Myrdal from the beginning as he fought political sentiment, some of the documentation alludes to dropping translation work owing to budgetary concerns. Furthermore, this story does not enunciate any degree of social history as the actors are few and limited. There are no petitions from “the people” or even references to the general population of countries or the continent. Myrdal and his colleagues look at the world on an international landscape with key actors managing nations and influential institutions that are imperative for collaboration of the UNECE.

As noted, there are various lenses from which to accumulate research points. There is constant interplay of domestic vs. international affairs that influence the UNECE narrative, which again contain both limitations and an expanded horizon of research possibilities. For example, one could find supporting and detailed material on how UNECE officials in the US coordinated efforts during the McCarthy era of domestic hysteria. This of course is a sub-history of the team’s provided narrative in this report. While correlations could have no doubt been made between these events and the history of this specific institution, our team felt it necessary to examine this six-year period to be more inclusive of broader points. This allowed the team to avoid the traps and pitfalls of specific but disconnected analysis, while raising larger questions that provide higher levels of value, substance and nuance.
Bibliography

Secondary Sources


Internet Sources:

Gunnar MYRDAL’s Biography on the official website of the UNECE:

Annex I: Archival Documents

Note: This is the exhaustive list of documents we exploited to write our archival report. The papers are ordered by box, by date and by type of documents.

Box No. 61

Myrdal’s Opening Speech, Timber Committee Eleventh Session, 5-10 October 1953

Box No. 68

File No. 1/3/7

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 30 March 1948

Personal and confidential letter from Myrdal to Glesinger, 8 April 1948

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 29 October 1948

Myrdal’s Biography by Glesinger, 7 December 1948

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 15 April 1949

Confidential letters from Myrdal to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Consulate General, 24 September and 12 October 1949

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 6 December 1949

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 3 March 1950

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 27 April 1950
Personal and confidential letters from Glesinger to Myrdal, 4 and 18 August 1950

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 4 December 1950

Personal and confidential letter from Glesinger to Myrdal, 23 October 1953

**Box No. 69**

Confidential correspondence between Myrdal and Owen, Dossier Varia, May - August 1948

Personal and confidential letters from Lethbridge to Price, Dossier Varia, May - August 1948

Confidential correspondence between Myrdal and Moderow, 31 May 1948

**Box No. 71**

**File No. 1/4/7**

Myrdal’s personal and confidential memorandum, *Note on the Political Background of the Crisis in ERP*, 6 December 1949


**Box No. 79**

Myrdal Speech at Sixth Conference of FAO, 19 November 1951

Myrdal’s Opening Speech, Seventh Session of UNECE, 3 March 1952
Box No. 80

Industry and Materials Committee, First Session Summary Record, Gunnar Myrdal, 22 November 1947

Personal and confidential letter from Owen to Myrdal, 30 December 1947

Personal and confidential from Owen to Myrdal, 9 April 1948

Personal and confidential letter from Owen to Myrdal, 11 April 1952

Box No. 89

Article: *Russia Found trying to Direct Satellite Trade*, undated (1951-1952)

Article: *Soviet Satellites Show Trade Drop*, 1951

Article: *Trade a Mutual Benefit*, News, No. 2, By Evegeny Menyhinsky, 2 July 1951

Personal and confidential letter from Owen to Myrdal, 11 April 1952